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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL S. STICKLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 7831

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the
record.)
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
(109-112) and from the judgment entered thereon plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
This is an action brought by plaintiff, an employee of
Rademann Guisto Co., building contractors, against the
Union Pacific Railroad Company for injuries received by
him in unloading a car delivered to his employer by the
said railroad company. Workmen's compensation was ob-
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tained by plaintiff from the insurance carrier of his employer. The insurance carrier signed a Waiver (Exhibit
"J"), wherein the carrier waived its right of subrogation and con sen ted that plain tiff herein could commence
and maintain the action in his own name against the
Union Pacific Railroad Company.
The trial court in granting defendant's motion for
a directed verdict held that the evidence would support
a finding that the defendant company was negligent in
sending a car to be unloaded which it knew had a defective metal strap and which strap was usually and customarily used to unload cars loaded as was the flatcar here
(110).
The trial court based his ruling on the proposition
that he believed plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and that if the railroad
company could see and discover upon reasonable inspection the defective strap·, then the plaintiff also could
have seen this condition and his failure to see constituted
contributory negligence on his part (110). Thus the court
failed to make a distinction between the fact that it was
the duty of the railroad company to inspect and that it
was not the duty of plaintiff to make an inspection. He
did, in fact, make a test of the strap involved by placing
his weight upon it before mounting to the top of the tank
involved (16).
The injury occurred on the 7th day of December,
1949, at ap·proximately 1 :30 p.m., in the yards of the
Pacific Fruit Express at Pocatello, Idaho (12). The
plaintiff was a steel worker employed by Rademann-
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Guisto Construction Co1npany and engaged in the erection of buildings for the Pacific Fruit Express. On the
date above 1nentioned, the plaintiff and others were assigned the task of unloading two large steel storage tanks
(1:2). These tanks were loaded on a flatcar which had
been delivered by the defendant to the yards in which
plaintiff 'vas working (12).
These t\vo tanks were the same size and were loaded
on the one flatcar. Each tank was cylindrical in shape,
approximately 10 to 12 feet in diameter, 20 feet in length
and weighed 27,000 and 30,000 pounds respectively (13
and Exhibit±).
The tanks were placed on the flatcar end to end.
These tanks rested on cribbing on top of the flatcar and
each tank was held down by two metal straps which were
attached to the sides of the flatcar and extended over the
top of the tanks. These metal straps were 3 to 4 inches
in width and approximately an eighth of an inch thick,
there being testimony that this band was similar to defendant's Exhibit 5. The straps were attached to each
side of the boxcar by being looped over a metal band
which went around the side of the flatcar. The end of
the strap was clamped to the other portion of the strap,
thereby forming a loop encircling the metal band on the
flatcar (15).
This flatcar was spotted by the defendant in the
yards where plaintiff was working. The car had to be
towed by truck down to the place where it was. to be unloaded ( 12-13) .
Prior to the spotting of this car it had been inspected
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by the defendant company (80). The defendant called the
witness George H. Cutler, who was the person in charge
of the inspection. Cutler identified defendant's Exhibit
1 as indicating that the inspection on this particular
car had disclosed there was a broken tie band (81). The
witness testified that he had. no recollection of this car
being bad ordered independent of Exhibit 1 (82). He
stated that it was the customary practice to place on
every car that is bad ordered a bad order card similar to
defendant's Exhibit 2. This would be attached to the car
with a stapling machine and where there was a defect
such as discovered in this case, they would place the bad
order card so that the side specifying light repairs would
be facing out (82). This witness also testified that a car
like this flatcar, having a broken tie band, was supposed
to be sent to the rip track to be repaired (87). This witness did not know whether the car was taken to the rip
track or not. He also testified:

"Q. Well, I am saying ordinarily if there is a
broken tie band on it they would take it in
and repair it, wouldn't they~
"A. Well, ordinarily.
"Q. Because one of those tie bands can be used
for one of two things, either for unloading or
to hold the storage tank in place, isn't that
right~

"A. y es, sir.
.
"Q. Isn't that right~
"A. y es, sir.
.
"Q. Now you say the cards are finally taken off
when they get to the rip track~
"A. The repair track, yes, sir.
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•'Q.

Or the repair track, yes, and tmtil that time
they remain on, I take it ?
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. .A. nd, of course your only job is just to bad
order the car and put that on and you leave it
up to the other people what should be done
'vith it~
".A. Yes, sir."
0

The witness testified that as a rule these cards are
put on the decking of a flatcar. By this he apparently
meant on the side of the car (90). Through leading questions defendant's counsel got the witness to testify that
a broken tie band would not render travel unsafe to the
point where the car would be unloaded and that it would
be safe to move from the point of inspection to the customer (90-91). He conceded, however, that if he figured
these straps would be used in unloading the car, he would
see to it that they were fixed before the car was sent to
the customer (92).
When the car was finally spotted for loading, it was
on a track running in a north and south direction. Cribbing had been placed in position on the ground upon
which the tank was to be placed. The first strap· to be used
was that on the south end of the car. The plaintiff used a
blowtorch in cutting the strap on the east side. The usual
and customary method of unloading a tank such as this
from a flatcar, was to place cables underneath the tank
and to attach the ends of the cable to a crane, then to hoist
the tank from the flatcar and finally lower it onto the cribbing prepared for it. This necessitated the presence of a
man on top of the tank in order to connect the cables to
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the crane. One of the usual and customary ways for the
1nan to place himself on top of the tank was to climb up
the side of the tank, using the strap to pull himself on top
(16). Before the plaintiff ascended the strap, he placed
his weight on it to see if it would hold him (16). It did
and seemed solid and secure (36) and he then commenced
to ascend. When he was almost on top, the strap broke
on the other or west side and he fell to the ground on his
f~et and suffered severe fractures in his ankles and legs
(16, 18).
As plaintiff fell, he carried with him the strap, pulling it down onto the east side of the car (17). After he
was made as comfortable as possible, examination was
made of the strap where it had broken. It appeared that
a quarter of an inch or less showed a bright clean break
and the rest of the break showed that it was corroded
and rusted, thereby indicating that it had been broken for
some period of time (17, 55).
Neither the plaintiff (47, 106) nor the foreman (56,
105) saw any bad order card on the car and they were
not informed of the fact that anything was wrong or
defective about the metal strap which had been broken.
They made no inspection of the band because they knew
that the railroad company made inspection before the
cars were unloaded by the consignee (48) and relied upon
that inspection and upon the assumption that the bands
or straps were in first class shape (43). In further discussing this break the plaintiff's witnesses stated that
they would not notice this break unless they were looking
for it (55-56) and examined it for that purpose (17, 44).
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The foregoing evidence is substantially all that relates to the question of liability in this case. We will not
detail the medical evidence because it is not of importance
on the question before the court. All that need be said
is that the plaintiff "~as seriously injured, remained in
the hospital fron1 four to five months, was unable to work
for a period of a year and the injuries have caused permanent disability.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS MATTER OF LAW.

POINT III.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT
FAILED TO REPAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE
BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD UNLOAD
THE TANKS FROM THE FLATCAR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.
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We strenuously assert that the ruling of the court
in directing a verdict and refusing to permit the jury to
determine the facts has resulted in a denial to plaintiff
of his right to a trial by jury.
When a tribunal has been selected to determine conflicting and disputed issues of fact, the right of that
tribunal to make the determination should remain inviolate.
Where reasonable minds may differ upon the finding
of a factual proposition, then the jury should be permitted to make the determination and the court should not
usurp its function. We respectfully submit that the trial
judge usurped the function of the jury in this case.
This court in the case of Shortino v. Salt Lake & U.
R. Co., 52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860, at page 866 set forth the
rule to be followed by trial courts in determining whether
or not a case should be submitted to the jury. This court
stated:
"That the question of contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, like that of the negligence of the defendant, is for the jury, where the
evidence and the inferences to be deduced therefrom are such that reasonable men may arrive at
different conclusions, has so often been decided
by this court that the proposition has, in effect,
become elementary.
"In other words, if there is any substantial
doubt whether a plaintiff was or was not guilty of
contributory negligence, or whether, if negligent,
such negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury, the court cannot determine the right to
recover as a matter of law, but must submit the
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question of contributory negligence or of proximate cause, or both, to the jury as questions of
fact."
Again this court stated in Newton v. Oregon Short
LineR. Co., 43lTtah 219, 13± P. 567, 570:
""\Vhere, therefore, the circumstances are such
that it may reasonably be said that different
n1inds, in viewing and considering the evidence,
n1ight arriYe at different conclusions with respect
to 'vhether or not the injured person exercised
ordinary care, the question of negligence must of
necessity be determined as one of fact and not of
law. vVhile the substance of the foregoing statement is often found in the books and may be said
to be a correct statement of the doctrine, yet such
statements often leave the reader in doubt whether
a given case falls within or without the doctrine.
But, notwithstanding this, it is impossible to formulate a rule by which all cases can be determined.
"All that can be said is that, unless the question of. negligence is free from doubt, the court.·
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is, if
after considering all the evidence and the inferences that may be deduced therefrom the court is
in doubt whether reasonable men, in· viewing and
considering all the evidence, might arrive at different conclusions, then this very doubt determines the question to be one of fa~t f6r the jury
and not one of law for the court. T~he court can··
pass upon the question of negligence ·only in cle~r
cases. All others should be submitted to the j~ry.
The reason of this is apparent from the fact :that
in this state all questions of fact are for the jury;
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing
and considering the evidence reaso~able minds

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
might not arrive at different conclusions, the case
should go to the jury."
To the same effect see Malizia v. Oregon Short Line
R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756 and Steed v. Rio Grande
W. Ry. Co., 29 Utah 448, 82 P. 476.
We submit that under the foregoing rules the refusal
of the trial court to permit determination of this case
by a jury constituted a violation of plaintiff's right to
a trial by jury, the tribunal selected to hear and determine issues of fact.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS MATTER OF LAW.

This court has given recognition to the authorities
heretofore cited in Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 170, 158
P. 2d 676, wherein the court stated:

"* * * In this jurisdiction we are committed
to the doctrine that the question of contributory
negligence is one for the jury, where as said in
Carpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 P. 2d 617,
619, 'different conclusions may be reasonably
drawn by different minds from the same evidence

* * *.' "

We submit that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on the proposition of whether or not
the plaintiff in this case was guilty of contributory negligence.
At the very beginning the court was following an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
entirely erroneous concept concerning contributory negligence. He took the utterly defenseless position that the
burden of proof \Yas upon the plaintiff to free himself
from contributory negligence. The court stated ( 111) :
''* * *but the fact that somebody is hurt doesn't
entitle him to take 1noney away from somebody else who isn't responsible for his injuries
and, of course, he must overcome and must show
that he, himself, is not guilty of any fault that contributed to his injury, because if he doesn't show
that tmder the law he is not entitled to recover."
Apparently the trial judge had the idea that it was
incumbent upon plaintiff to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was not quilty of contributory
negligence. To establish that such statement is erroneous certainly needs no citation of authority.
There can be little wonder that the trial court reached the erroneous result that defendant was entitled to
a directed verdict when it started out with the proposition that the burden was upon plaintiff to prove his freedom from contributory negligence. Consideration of the
evidence in this case will clearly establish that the question of contributory negligence was for the jury in this
case.
The plaintiff and his foreman had the task of unloading the tanks from the flatcar. Theirs was not a duty
to inspect. Precautions might be expected from them as
reasonably prudent persons in the performance of their
job. As matter of fact, the plaintiff tested the strap to
see whether or not it would bear his weight when he
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grabbed hold of it and caused his weight to be exerted
against the strap. The strap held his weight. A reasonable man could well find that this test so made by plaintiff was all that needed to be done in the exercise of
reasonable care, and that a reasonably prudent person
would have done no more to protect himself.
In making a determination of whether plaintiff
acted with reasonable care, we must take into consideration all of the surrounding circumstances. One of those
circumstances was his knowledge that the railroad company made inspection of the cars before they were unloaded. The foreman stated that he knew of this custom
and that in the unloading of cars, such custom was relied
upon by him in unloading cars. With these men knowing
and relying upon the inspection of the railroad, certainly
we cannot say that all reasonable minds would necessarily
conclude that a p·erson employed to unload the tanks
would make minute inspection of the load and cars to
determine whether or not they could be unloaded with
absolute safety to himself. As indicated, the plaintiff
did make a test and we submit that th~s test should have
been enough to make a jury question of the proposition
of whether or not he was in the exercise of reasonable
care in climbing to the top of the tank after making the
test stated.
The courts have recognized that the railroad in effect
represents to a consignee and his employee that a car is
in a reasonably safe condition to be unloaded and certainly an employee should be entitled to rely upon that
representation.
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In Folsom v. Lowden, 157 Kan. 328, 139 P. 2d 822,
8:26, the court stated:
""Appellee is the delivering carrier. The general rule is that a railway company, when it delivers a ear of freight to a consignee to be unloaded, in the absence of notice to the consignee to the
contrary, represents to the consignee, or his employee, that the car is in reasonably safe condition
to be unloaded."
The court in Paul v. Georgia Railway & Banking Co.,
60 Ga. App. 461, 4 S. E. (2d) 99, found that a jury question on contributory negligence was presented in the case.
In doing so it determined that th·e plaintiff could rely upon an assumption that the defendant had discharged its
duty toward plaintiff. In that case the plaintiff and
others were unloading cars and as they moved the next-tothe-last car, the last car also moved and plaintiff was injured because of this movement. The defendant railroad
company had spotted the car and plaintiff was permitted
to rely upon the discharge by the defendant of its duty
to adequately set the brakes on this car. The court stated:

"* * * The petition alleged that the plaintiff
had the right to expect that the defendant had
exercised ordinary care in placing said car and in
applying the brakes so that it would not move
when the car in front of it was moved. It alleged
that after the front car had been moved a short
distance he discovered that the last car was rolling
toward him about to catch him between the cars
and that when he discovered this it was too late
to get out of the way, although he did everything
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possible. This allegation makes a jury question
and it was error to sustain the general demurrer."
The trial court in giving his reasons for directing
a verdict stated (110-111):
"Now in this case he is charging the railroad
with having been negligent in that they failed to
exercise reasonable care for his safety and the law
says, by the same token, that the plaintiff must
exercise reasonable care for his safety and the
evidence in this case shows, by the plaintiff himself, that had he walked around and looked at
this strap that he was about to use as a ladder to
climb up this side of this tank that he would have
seen that the strap was torn and that it probably
was not safe.
"Now the railroad, he says, should have done
that and should have warned him. In other words,
he is charging the railroad with the same thing
that the evidence shows he failed to do for his
own safety and the doctrine and well settled law
is that if a person is himself guilty of negligenc~
which contributes to his own injury that that is
fatal to his right to recover against somebody else,
and it is on that basis that I have determined as a
matter of law, and without any question of fact,
that the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to recover against the railroad in this instance."
We respectfully submit that the trial court erroneously placed a duty of inspection on the plaintiff and
classified that duty as being the same as the duty of the
defendant, to make inspection of the ca.r· and its load.
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He held as n1atter of la\Y that it \Yas inrumbent upon the
plaintiff to make careful inspection of the strap. He required that this inspection be Inade by a visual exainination of all parts of the strap and \ve assume that he would
be required under this ruling of the court to inspect all
parts of the car. \Ve have found no case which imposes
any such duty upon the plaintiff. He did make a test
of the strap, "\vhich "\Ve believe a jury could find constituted an exercise of reasonable care in that regard.
Because the defect in the strap could be found by
looking for it, does not mean that plaintiff was guilty of
negligence because he did not see it. He had no duty to
inspect, that 'vas the duty of the defendant. If a person
has no required duty to look, certainly the fact that he
does not see because he did not look cannot establish
negligence on his part as matter of law. If the defect
could not have been seen by looking, then it would have
been a latent defect and there would have been no liability
on defendant. This latent defect rule seems well established. ·see Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 817; Mickelson v. Erie R. Co., 106 N.J.L. 147, 147 A. 535. There was
no duty to inspect so far as the consignee, RademannGuisto Co. was concerned. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hum-

mel, 167 F. 89. If there was no duty on the part of plaintiff's employer to inspect, then certainly there was no
duty on the part of plaintiff to make inspection. Plaintiff's task was to use the strap, not to inspect it, and the
jury could have found that since he was going to use it,
the test he applied, of his own weight, would constitute
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an exercise of reasonable care for his own safety and
hence would have made it a jury question.
In the case of Maher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
278 F. 431, 434, the defendant delivered a car loaded with
ice to plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff had removed some
of the ice and delivered it to several customers. Between
deliveries he closed the door. He noticed certain defects
in the door, but irrespective of these defects he continued
to use such door and the next morning while he was endeavoring to close the door, it came off the rail on which
it was hung and injured him. The trial court ruled as
matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence. The appellate court reversed. In discussing
contributory negligence the court stated:
"Under federal law this is a defense which
must be affirmatively established by defendant.
To warrant a directed verdict it must be established conclusively. This defense may be drawn from
the plaintiff's evidence; and in the present case the
only evidence bearing on the subject came from
plaintiff himself. He testified that before the injury he had observed the general ramshackle condition of the door and its fan-like or scissors-like
action; but not until after the injury had he observed the sag in the rail, the arch in the canopy,
and the worn-down condition of the hanger. These
latter things he undoubtedly could have discovered
by inspection. They were the things which, in the
rickety condition of the door, permitted the hanger
to jump off of the rail. He did not discover them.
He was a merchant, not a car inspector. Was it
negligence for him not to have discovered them
and thereupon to have suspended delivery of ice
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to his custo1ners (in midsum1ner) until on his
co1nplaint defendant had repaired the door1 During all of the necessary occasions on the 12th he
opened and closed the door without injury. 'It
"rorked hard,' but it worked. And even if his retina had registered a photograph of the rail, the
canopy, and the hanger, that would not be enough.
For him to have apprehended the danger it would
have been necessary for him mentally to have followed the application of force on the edge of the
door, to and through the boards held together only
at the· top, to and through the hanger in its relation to rail and canopy, and to have realized the
likelihood or possibility of the hanger's being
forced from the rail as it came to the enlarged
space between the rail and canopy. Compare
Hawley v. C. B. & Q. Rid. Co., 133 Fed. 150, 152,
153, 66 C.C.A. 216. Would a reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances have realized that
he must quit using the door for its intended use
or take upon himself the consequences of its further use J? In our opinion reasonable and fairminded men might differ in their answers, and
the question should therefore have been submitted
to the jury."
The above case is. stronger for defendant than the
case at bar, because here plaintiff was not aware of any
dangerous conditions and relied upon the straps being
in first class condition (43).

In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Freppon, 134 Ky. 650,
121 S.W. 454, the plaintiff, an employee of a consignee,
was injured when he attempted to open the door of the
car. Defendant contended that he was quilty of contribu-
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tory negligence as matter of law, but this contention
was held erroneous and the court stated :

"* * * The point is further made that F:reppon
was guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to
defeat a recovery. But the facts do not authorize
this assumption. There is no evidence that he
knew or had reasonable- grounds to believe that
the car door would fall if he knocked the pin out,
or that he failed to exercise ordinary care for his
own safety. The question of whether or not he was
guilty of contributory negligence was fairly submitted to the jury in an instruction telling them,
in substance, that if they believed from the evidence that the plain tiff failed to use ordinary
care in unloading the car, and was careless and
negligent in so unloading the same, and that but
for his own carelessness and negligence the accident and injury would not have occurred, they
should find for the defendant."
In Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. Riddle, 182
Okl. 318, 82 P. 2d 304, the defendant contended that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of
law. Plaintiff had been injured when he was struck by
a falling door from a boxcar. This door had been cleated
up to hold it in place. The plaintiff and his fellow workers
plied these cleats from the door in attempting to open it
and then when they tried to slide the door, it fell, causing
the injuries indicated. Defendant's evidence was directed
toward showing that there was a written warning "Do
Not Open" upon the door and that it was a warning of
a dangerous condition. Defendant contended that in violating this warning, plaintiff was guilty of contributory
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negligence as matter of la,v. The court held that the
question "~as one for the jury and that a jury could find
that plaintiff "Tas exercising ordinary care for his own
safety. In the case at bar there was evidence upon which
a jury could find that no warning of any kind was given
to the plaintiff. His use of the strap under those conditions "Tould not be negligence as matter of law, if it was
not negligence to atten1pt to use the door which had a sign
prohibiting its use .
.~..:\.nother case helpful to plaintiff is that of Lewis v.
Soutlzern Pac. Co. (Cal. App.), 220 P. 2d 431. Plaintiff was _an employee of a shipper to whose yards the defendant delivered a car for loading. After the car was
loaded, plaintiff attempted to close the door. It would not
move and a fellow employee took a pinch bar and was
applying pressure on the door while plaintiff was attempting to pull it. The door fell outward from the top
upon plaintiff causing his injuries. A verdict was rendered for plaintiff and on appeal the main contention
by defendant was that plaintiff was guilty of negligence
in atten1pting to close the door, and among other things
that he should have observed the guides on the door.
The court refused to follow this argument and stated,
(p. 433) :

"* * * Whether they should, acting as persons
of ordinary care and prudence, have observed the
defective guides and whether if they had they
should with their knowledge have realized the
danger were properly questions for the jury. 'Contributory negligence is a question of law only when
the court is impelled to say that from the facts
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his own safety, but there \Yere others he could have taken.
It was held a jury question \vas 1nade. Plaintiff was engaged in loading a car \Yith c_oal. He was told that the
car brake was \Veak; that it was necessary to keep the
coal car in control inasmuch as there was a car below on
the same track, from which other employees were unloading furniture. Plaintiff proceeded to place a scotch
on the track about a car-length below, in order to stop
the car in case the brakes should not hold. The brakes
were then released and when plaintiff saw that they
would not hold, and that the scotch did not work and that
the car would collide \v'ith the furniture car, he placed
another piece of timber before one of the rear wheels of
the truck. In doing so his hand was caught by the wheel
and his arm· cut off. The trial judge directed a verdict
for defendant. This was reversed on appeal and the court
stated (p. 199) :
"There was evidence that the railroad company furnished a car with a seriously defective
brake, knowing that the brake would be depended
on to hold the car loaded with coal on a steep
grade, and that the defect in the brake was the
proximate cause of the accident. If nothing else
appeared, the liability of the railroad company
would result.
"The question of assumption of risk. was
for the jury. . . . It is true that, after the loading was half completed, the plaintiff had notice of
his coworker's opinion that the brake was weak.
But it had held in process of loading, and there
is no evidence that plaintiff or his coworker, Clifton, knew there was any specific defect; and the
defendant could not put upon the plaintiff or his
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employer the duty of diligence in discovering the
defect. It follows that the question whether mere
notice of weakness was under the circumstances
sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice of
both the defect and the danger was for the jury.
Nor does the evidence necessarily require the
inference of contributory negligence. The plaintiff and his coworker, Clifton, expected the scotch
to so retard the car that the brake would hold it.
Upon the jury's view of the reasonableness of this
precaution and expectation will depend their d~
cision of that issue. When the plaintiff discovered
that the brake and the scotch first provided failed
to hold the car in control, it was not negligence
in the emergency to try to stop the car, to save the
life or property of others, by placing another
scotch under the wheels, unless the action taken
was heedles~ or reckless, or the e~ergency was
brought about by plaintiff's own fault. The evidence did not warrant the withdrawal of that question from the jury."
It will be noted in the foregoing case that the defendant had specific knowledge of the defective brake, yet the
question of contributory negligence was left to the, jury.
Even though a person might have seen a dangerous
condition if he had looked for it, does not mean that he is
guilty of contributory negligence for not having made
visual examination when there was no reason to anticipate the presence of such a dangerous condition.
We have been unable to find any cases involving unloading of cars on this particular proposition, but in the
case of Van Horn v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com. , 54
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Wyo. 346, 92 P. 2d 560, 562, the rules have been well
stated as follows :

* * Here, we think the rnore pertinent principle applicable is as held in Chicago Telephone
Con1pany v. Cornmercial Union Assurance Co.,
Ltd., of London, 131 Ill. App. 248, that the doctrine
of contributory negligence does not apply where it
appears that the omission or conduct alleged to
constitute contributory negligence was in the doing or the not doing of some act or acts in relation
to a danger not reasonably to have been apprehended. In the opinion in that case the decision in
Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich. 1, 7, 46 N.W. 21, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 549, was quoted to this effect: 'It is a
sound rule of la-\v that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no
reason to apprehend any. Beach, Contrib. Neg.,
41.'
"In Foreman v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 228 Ky. 300, 14 S.W. 2d 1079, 1081, the court
declared: 'Contributory negligence is not imputable to any one for failing to look out for danger
which he has no reasonable cause to apprehend.'
Shearman and Redfield, Sec. 90, 653, 654.'
"Said the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Wall v. King, 280 Mass. 577, 182 N. E.
855, 856: 'One is bound to anticipate and p.roiVide
against what usually happens and what is likely
to happen, but is not bound in like manner to
guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen, or what, as is sometimes said, is only remotely and slightly probable.' Falk v. Finkelman, 268
Mass. 524, 527, 168 N. E. 89, 90."
~~*

This rule is similarly stated in Locke v. Red River
Lumber Co., 65 Cal. Ap·p. 2d 322, 150 P. 2d 506, 509.
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The plain tiff was injured as a result of stepping into an
open crack in the concrete floor of the defendant's store.
Defendant contended that she was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The court held that this
was a question for the jury and stated:
"We may not hold as a matter of law that the
plaintiff in this case was guilty of contributory
negligence in failing to see the hole in the concrete
floor of the aisle. We cannot say she did not use
that degree of care which should have been exercised by a reasonably prudent person under such
circumstances. That being true, we may not interfere with the finding of the court in that regard.
The plaintiff had no previous knowledge of the
defect in the floor. She had no reason to anticipate
that the main aisle to the front entrance in that
general mercantile establishment would be in a
dangerous condition for customers to use. She had
a right to assume the proprietor of the store would
provide his invited customers with safe aisles in
which to walk."
In the case at bar there was no reason for the plaintiff to anticipate any defect in the strap over the tank,
particularly in view of the fact that he knew that the
railroad company was supposed to make an inspection.
We submit that the trial court erred in holding that
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish
his freedom from contributory negligence and then superimposing upon this erroneous rule a finding that as a
matter of law the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence.
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POINT III.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT
FAILED TO REPAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE
BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD UNLOAD
THE TANKS FROM THE FLATCAR.

The trial court ruled that a jury que'Stion had been
made on the proposition of defendant's negligence. In
that regard the court stated (110):
"'X O\Y of course the railroad, they can't an-

ticipate every use that a person will make of their
facilities, such as a strap. That is the purpose· of
the strap to hold down the load, and they can't be
charged with knowledge that somebody may use it
as a trapeze or a swing or as a ladder to climb
up the tank.
"Now the plaintiff seeks to overcome that by
showing that the usual custom and practice in unloading cars was for n1en to do that and therefore
the railroad was charged with the knowledge that
that might be done, but from that standpoint
the case might be submitted to a jury and they
might conclude that the railroad didn't exercise
all of the care that was necessary to protect the
plaintiff in that regard. But the hurdle that I believe the plaintiff cannot overcome is the doctrine
in law that we call contributory negligence."
In this ruling we believe that the trial court was
correct. However, we do not know whether defendant
contends or will contend that the proof also failed to
make a jury question of defendant's negligence and proxinlate causation.
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In Raymond v. Union Pa.c. R. Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.
2d 137, 139, the plaintiff was an employee of a consignee
of a car and load delivered by the Union Pacific Railroad
Company. That same company is the defendant in the
case at bar. With respect to the contentions there made,
the court stated:
"Plaintiff asserts and defendant admits that a
railroad company will be held liable to a consignee
or such consignee's employee if the railroad company delivers a defective car or a car with a defective load and such consignee or its employees
are injured thereby."
We believe that such rule is well established by the
authorities.
In the case at bar, the defendant by its inspection
discovered the defective strap which held the tanks in
place. Evidence was introduced that the usual and customary way to unload tanks from a flatcar was for a person to get on top of the tank to make the necessary attachment of the cables and tank to the crane. Evidence was
also introduced showing that the usual and customary
way of ascending the tank was to use the strap. Under
this state of facts, the defendant should either have re~
paired the defective strap or should have given adequate
warning of the condition of the strap to the consignee or
its employees.
One of the witnesses for the defendant company
testified that bad ordered cars should go to the repair
track and a car with a broken tie band, such as the car in
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question, should have been sent to the rip track to be
repaired ~ S7). The evidence establishes the fact that
this tie band 'Yas never repaired and apparently the car
was not sent to the rip track. Based upon the failure of
the railroad to Inake the necessary repairs on thjs tie
band, the jury could find that it failed to use reasonable
care in protecting the consignee and its employees from
the defectiYe condition so found, and that in placing the
car in the yards for unloading purposes, it was guilty of
negligence. See La.dd v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
193 Mass. 359, 79 N. E. 7-±2, where defendant failed to
make repairs after knowledge of a defective door.
Contention was made by the defendant that adequate
notice had been given by placing the bad order card on
the car. The jury could have found that this bad order
card 'Yas never placed upon the car, for the reason that
the evidence on this issue was conflicting. Defendant's
witnesses testified that they had no independent recollection of the inspection of the car in question. The records
of the company disclosed that employees of the defendant
had discovered the broken tie band. Testimony was also
introduced that the usual and customary practice was
to place a card on the car, indicating it was bad ordered
and also indicating what was wrong with the car or its
contents. Plaintiff and his foreman testified that they
did not see a card on the car. Hence, there being a conflict in the evidence, the jury could determine that no card
was placed upon the car in question. The jury could find
that the defendant had found the defective tie band and
had given no notice to the consignee or its employees
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and had negligently placed the same in the yards of the
Pacific F'ruit Express for the purpose of unloading.
Also, the jury could find that merely to place a bad
order card on a car in a place where it was not seen and
that defendant did nothing further to call the attention
of the consignee or its employees to the defective tie band,
constituted negligence on its part in failing to give
reasonably adequate warning of a known defect.
Many cases could be cited to support the proposition that the defendant owed a duty to RademannGuisto Company and its employees, including plaintiff, to
make a reasonable inspection to determine whether the
car could be safely unloaded and give special warning of
any defect so found. We do not anticipate that there will
be any dispute concerning this principle of law. See St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Ewan, 26 ·F'. 2d 619; Erie
R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F .. 2d 817; Hanson v. Ponder, 300
S. W. 35; Heaven v. Pender, (1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. Div.
503. This latter case is a much cited English case and is
discussed at 41 A.L.R. 58.
When defendant's witnesses testified that their concern was whether the car could be safely transported,
they were not discharging the duty imposed upon defendant. The car was delivered by defendant to be unloaded and hence it duty extended not only to safe transportation but safe unloading. In Erie R. Co. v. Murphy,
supra, the court set forth the contention of the railroad as
follows, ( p. 818) :
"Appellant's first contention is that, as delivering carrier, it was under no duty so to in-
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spect a sealed car received fron1 another earrier
as to ascertain '\Vhether it 'vas safe for unloading,
but that only such inspection was required as
'vould reveal 'vhether the car was reasonably fit
for transportation."
It then ans"'ered the contention as follows:
"..._1\.ppellant's first contention is contrary to
the great 'veight of authority. When injury in
unloading a car is the proximate result of the
car's unsafe condition, the delivering carrier is
almost invariably held liable, if a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect and the
carrier gave no notice thereof. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co. v. E'van, 8 Cir., 26 F. 2d 619;
Copeland et al. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 8 Cir.,
293 F. 12; niissouri Pac. R. Co. v. S.ellers, 188 Ark.
218, 65 S. W. 2d 14; Doering v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., et al., Mo. App. 63 S. W. 2d 450; Griffin v. Payne, Director General of Railroads, 95
N.J.L. 490, 113 A. 247; Roy v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., et al., 17 Ga. App. 34, 86 S. E. 328; Corbett v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 215 Mass. 435,
102 N. E. 648. Cf. Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co. v.
Rupp, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 212.
"Since appellant was under a duty to appellee
to exercise reasonable care to discover and give
timely notice of defects that might imperil appellee's safety, the only remaining question is
whether there was substantial evidence that appellant failed to perform that duty."
In this latter case the wheel of a hand truck being
used by plaintiff fell through a hole in the floor of the
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car causing plaintiff's foot to be caught between the floor
and the loaded truck. The court concluded:

"* * * Though the evidence was conflicting
as to whether an inspector should have carded a
car as unsafe or defective under the circumstances
here presented, there was substantial evidence
from which a jury could reasonably infer that an
ordinary inspection would have revealed the hole
in the car floor and that, it having been discovered, reasonable care required that notice be given
that the condition of the floor might make unloading perilous."
We respectfully submit that the court correctly ruled
that a question of fact for the jury was presented by the
evidence on the proposition of defendant's negligence
proximately causing the injuries to plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Under the foregoing authorities it is apparent that
the trial court erroneously denied to plaintiff his right
to a jury trial when it directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant. For such reason we submit that this Honorable Court should reverse the case and send it back to the
trial court to be tried and the questions of fact determined by a tribunal selected to try cases involving conflicting issues of fact.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Counsel for Appellarnt
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